Navy SEAL cadets will participate in Basic Underwater Destruction/SEALs (BUD/S) training in 2018.us navy pictures
Navy attorneys are considering a study to determine potential punishment for sailors who may be responsible for the death of a SEAL candidate in 2022, USNI News has revealed.
Rear Admiral Peter Garvin, commander of the Naval Education Command, said in support of the command’s investigation into the death of 24-year-old seaman Kyle Mullen, that sailors should receive about 10 training and treatment in Underwater Blast and SEAL Basic Training. It recommended that the different duties of the Candidates may face prosecution. A Navy spokesman did not specify the number of sailors at risk of punishment. USNI News understands that the decision will be left to the Commander based on recommendations from Navy attorneys.
The March 24 endorsement was based on a November investigation into the circumstances surrounding Mr. Mullen’s death on February 4, 2022, which found several deficiencies in the medical supervision of SEAL training, particularly around the “Hell Week” graduation exercise. It is the top of the survey that identified the Lack of written policy, guidance, and poor communication, including Hell Week and training-related medical issues, led health care workers to overlook deteriorating symptoms in Mullen and other unnamed SEAL candidates.
Kyle Mullen
“The research identifies aggregate risks as a result of inadequate supervision, inadequate risk assessment, inadequate medical command and control, and the use of undetected performance-enhancing drugs,” Garvin said. Wrote in a document supporting an investigation conducted by Maj.
An October investigation into Mullen’s death in the line of duty found that the sailor died of cardiomegaly, a bacterial pneumonia caused by an enlarged heart. According to the chronology surrounding Mullen’s death, which was included in the May 25 and October surveys, Mullen suffered from respiratory illness throughout Hell Week and eventually pneumonia after finishing the phase. was found to have died in
A lack of communication between health care providers left Mullen’s deteriorating condition unmonitored. Another Shields candidate also had trouble breathing and was taken to hospital with Mullen. The anonymous candidate was eventually intubated and diagnosed with pneumonia.
On February 3, 2022, Mullen’s symptoms worsened, causing him to cough violently, and when he got up, a dark liquid was flowing out of his nose and mouth, causing concern for his classmates.
On their way to the medical facility, the candidates were stopped by an anonymous person who woke them up and told them it was not time to go to the medical facility because they were being contacted about their medical condition.
The investigation did not reveal what happened during the call that morning.
Download the document here.
Mullen was treated with high-flow oxygen on Friday, February 4, 2022 due to low oxygen saturation levels. After receiving oxygen therapy, his vital statistics returned to normal and he appeared normal, talking about playing football at Yale and singing Taylor Swift.
He then returned to training before having to return to the ambulance again due to difficulty breathing.
Ambulance medics treated Mullen as if he was suffering from swim-induced pulmonary edema. Swim-induced pulmonary edema is a condition that can be associated with exposure to cold water, causing difficulty breathing and expectorating frothy, pink phlegm. SIPE is a common condition among SEAL candidates, and Reynolds’ research suggests that health care providers may have normalized SIPE and kept it free of signs and symptoms of other illnesses, such as pneumonia. There was found.
The health care worker who gave Mullen oxygen in the ambulance did not warn other health care workers of the progress. Mullen’s treatment at the scene was not recorded in BTC’s medical records. When the health care provider next examined Mr. Mullen, they noticed diffuse crackling sounds in his lungs.
Medical professionals, unaware that Mullen needed oxygen, did not recognize that there might be more serious concerns and did not order additional diagnostic tests.
“In the absence of reported symptoms, respiratory problems, or field reports of abnormal vital signs, diffuse crackling in the lungs alone is not sufficient. [redacted] To trigger the SIPE protocol or conduct further diagnostic testing, according to a May investigation.”
Despite his worsening condition, Mullen repeatedly refused hospital visits and treatment for fear of being removed from SEAL training.
SEALs in training off the coast of Coronado, California in 2018.us navy pictures
“He told friends and family that he would ‘never ring the bell’ and that he would die before he quit,” according to a May investigation.
A May survey noted that candidates shared concerns about appearing weak and dropping out of training, which made them reluctant to seek treatment. . In some cases, medical professionals did not understand the symptoms candidates experienced as part of BUD/S, leading to recommendations by Navy medical providers not to go to the hospital for treatment. Each candidate received a hard copy of a medical brief urging them to go to a Naval Special Warfare Center medical officer rather than a civilian medical practitioner.
“The hard copy of the NSWCEN medical report has the phone number of the medical officer on duty and states that ‘do not go see other health care providers’. Call 911 if it’s a real emergency.) …if you go to see other health care workers who don’t understand Hell Week, they’ll put you in the hospital or give you medication that doesn’t fit your training. ,” said the study.
In Mullen Death Base Underwater Blast/SEAL, both the Naval SEAL Command and the SEAL Basic Training Command have medical units that supervise SEAL-trained sailors, independent of each other and adjacent to each other. active, which led to continued disjointed care. and non-compliance with policy.
During Mullen’s class, BTC Medical and Naval Special Warfare Center Medical did not meet or practice with each other.
“at least, [Navy policy] When a patient is handed over to subsequent care or treatment, the care provider is responsible for ensuring optimal continuity of care, including the reason for the referral and the process of receiving or sharing relevant patient information related to the patient’s body. Mandatory that must be adjusted. Psychosocial status, care provided, treatment, service summary and progress towards goals, current medication list, etc., according to the May test.
The Naval Special Warfare Center did not have a signed directive to administer the Medical Center or the BTC Medical Center. Instead, it operated using unsigned standard operating procedures, according to inspections, and did not address medical practices or protocols for the care of SEAL candidates in the field or during deployment.
The Emergency Action Plan was to be reviewed by the Naval Special Warfare Center’s Senior Medical Officer, but was instead given review authority by the direction of the Basic Training Command to the BTC Medical Director.
“The EAP that was introduced at the time of class 352 [Mullen’s class] It was not signed by NWSCEN SMO, but was signed instead. [redacted]BTC Medical Department Independent Soldiers,” according to a survey in May.
Due to unit-to-unit breakdowns, BTC medics were sometimes unable to contact Naval Special Warfare Center medics. Medical providers at the Naval Special Warfare Center did not have her BTC medical records to review prior to conducting a medical examination, which also affected continued treatment.
The Naval Special Warfare Center Medical Division and the BTC Medical Division were combined for a 180-day trial to correct some of the issues raised during the May inspection, according to the inspection.
Three others in Mullen’s class were sent to hospital with symptoms of pneumonia. One was diagnosed with another strain of pneumonia, and the other two were discharged with a “productive cough.” One of her three candidates was monitored by a SIPE whiteboard.
Medical staff conducted multiple tests after Mullen ended his hell week, and a final medical check was performed without diagnostic tools on Friday, February 4, 2022 at 1:00 pm. The Naval Special Warfare Center then closed the clinic and assigned a medical on duty call.
Around 2pm, Mullen’s condition deteriorated and the candidate went to seek help at the medical center, which was unmanned. Candidates then called a medical worker on duty and told them they could go to the hospital if Mullen was unwell, but she was likely to be hospitalized. Another medical check is scheduled in the morning.
Another candidate started having trouble breathing and wanted hospital treatment, so they called the doctor on duty again. Mullen also needs care, and an anonymous person told the candidates to call 911 because the clinic was closed.
SEAL Candidates doing physical training on the beach during Basic Underwater Blast/SEAL (BUD/S) training at the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Center in Coronado, Calif., May 4, 2020. US Navy photo.
By the time emergency services reached Mullen, he was unresponsive. A May survey found that the guards were not performing CPR because they were not trained.
The survey also pointed to problems with the medical leadership of the Basic Training Command, with members of the BTC medical division expressing concern over the lack of leadership, medical competence, and impatience of unnamed leaders.
Captain Bradley Geary
Captain Bradley Geary, commander of the Basic Training Force at the time of Mullen’s death, chose to lead rather than assist the leader.
The survey also highlighted concerns about turnover rates in Mullen’s class and those before it. According to the survey, Mr. Geary attributed the turnover rate to the current generation’s lack of mental toughness.
Private officials were employed as instructors to provide continuity, but tensions arose between private officials and incumbent instructors. As a result, Mr. Geary told civilians who had expressed concern about the increased risk of training to allow active-duty instructors to take on more leadership roles.
Geary’s turnover rate during his tenure has risen above historic levels, raising a red flag. In 2021 and 2022, headcount reductions in the first three weeks of Phase 1 before Hell Week were 48 percent and 49 percent, respectively, compared to the historical average of 30 percent.
To control turnover, Mr. Geary required candidates to get six hours of sleep the night before Hell Week and canceled additional training that was seen as extra work.
“Captain. According to the research, Mr. Gere maintained the view that high turnover is due, among other things, to the current generation’s low mental resilience, or low ‘toughness.’ “As a result, he removed Lachlan and added sleep obligations, but said he had insufficient control over the enforcement of senior instructors and would take no additional action against the continued increase in attrition throughout Class 353. I made a decision.”
Geary, along with Captain Brian Drexler, was responsible for overseeing the candidate’s medical care. Geary said he handed over command to Colonel Timothy Surrick in June 2022.